This essay seeks to understand the potlatch as indicative of a wider category of exchange.
Introduction
This essay looks at wild forms of exchange in the making of the modern world 1 . I am calling these exchanges potlatch and in strict terms, the potlatch is a ritual belonging to certain aboriginal peoples along America's north-west coast while my particular focus is in relation to the history of central Africa. But, following Luc De Heusch (2002) and Filip De Boeck (1999) , I am struck by the great similarity between certain exchange events in central Africa and the true potlatches of North America. It is central to the argument made here that the potlatch was a ritual that arose out of the interaction of two very different kinds of society -densely populated commercial civilisations (which were sometimes capitalist), and 'human modes of production' (see anon)
In examining this matrix I make recourse to the theories of 'articulation' and 'social reproduction' developed by French Marxist Anthropologists working in the 1960s and 1970s, scholars who wrote about west and west central Africa. Deeply unfashionable today, I show how their work was a far more heterodox kind of Marxism than is generally acknowledged, and argue that it still has much to teach us. I also show their 1 By 'wild', I mean to exchange rituals in which huge fortunes were dispersed in competitive manner, where participants gave the impression of abandoning calibrated calculation in favour of a spirit of grandeur.
limitations, giving examples of how their contribution might be built on with reference to subsequent scholarship.
Drawing on Wyatt MacGaffey's work on politics in 19 th century central Africa, I show how social dominance in pre-colonial central Africa was embedded in a set of exchanges that pervaded the whole society -encompassing not just marriage but an entire ritual nexus that was both jural and therapeutic. Social leverage also depended heavily on notions of ancestral power -the curses and blessings of the dead were crucial in sorting the slave from the freeborn. Drawing on Jane Guyer's work I show that power was also more theatrical, and more unstable, than the French Marxist
Anthropologists implied.
Ultimately I suggest that the potlatch dynamic was a catastrophe that affected an entire class of societies that stood in a similar relation to the expanding commercial and later capitalist, civilisations of the early modern and modern period. Drawing on, but also taking issue with some aspects of David Graeber's (2012:127-164) fascinating theorisation of similar material, I argue that this catastrophe was the result of a complex social picture that combined demographic stagnation or collapse, massive external demand placed on economies characterised by very low productivity and harvesting from the wild, and a kind of ritual escalation caused by increased trade and the destabilisation of authority. This led to a kind of paradox where individual wealth depended on aggregate impoverishment and individual assertions of authority made authority more generally ever more fragile.
But first things first -using the term 'potlatch' as indicative of a wider category of exchanges is not new and in understanding my usage we must consider earlier theories, and look a little at the nature of the 'true' potlatch societies.
Mauss and the potlatch
In his famous account of 'archaic exchange', Marcel Mauss used a ritual common to the Indians of the north-west coast of America, known as the 'potlatch', to represent what he believed to be an entire category of archaic exchange. Many people, including many anthropologists, have come to believe that the term potlatch relates to the destruction of property, or 'fighting with property'. But both Mauss and other sources make it clear that destruction was just one (rather unusual) possibility. Work in the north-west American region acknowledges a competitive and destructive dimension but lays more stress on the potlatch as a form of ceremonial distribution (Roth 2002 ) through which individuals could accede to names that also granted ritual/political office within clans.
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These offices also granted various forms of usufruct rights, particularly to shellfish beds and salmon runs. While the abundance of the American North-West environment is often stressed, it is clear there were periods of scarcity that became particularly serious if actors were unable to acquire sufficient labour during the seasons of plenty.
An important bottleneck in the cycle was in securing the labour involved in catching and preserving salmon during the winter run (Donald 1997:133-136) . Wealthy 'name holders' sought to overcome this shortage via slavery. As this suggests, rights in the labour of others were crucial to accumulating material surpluses, and most north-west coast societies were divided into several classes, the basic divisions being name holders, commoners, and slaves. 3 Name-holding office also granted rights in the labour of dependent kin and slaves. Slavery was probably the ultimate form of wealth, and killing or giving away a slave was a not-infrequent part of funerals and nameholding ceremonies (Donald 1997:39-40, 76-79) .
As well as an exchange of goods, the potlatch was an elaborate ceremonial and theatrical event with strong elements of music and dance (Ringel 1979) . This was important in several senses. First, because ownership of songs and dances, along with certain other material and immaterial possessions were integral to being a title holder (Ringel 1979:350) . . Second, because the name taking was validated via a spectacle.
Recent authors have stressed that goods given to spectators at funerals or naming ceremonies are a kind of payment for acting as witness, and music was an integral and expensive part of the giving. Presence and receipt of payment also marked some kind of acquiescence by the demos in the authority of the title acquirer (Roth 2002:126) . 2 Roth argues that the 'skeleton' of the Tsimshian potlatch was in fact concentrated in funerary ritual and that the aggressive competition over accession to name was an ornamental element in the late contact period. 3 The Tsimshian, for example, divided people into four classes which translate as 'real people', 'other people', 'unhealed people', and 'slaves' (Donald 1997:284-285) .
But this gesture towards legitimacy was also, in part, some kind of claim about access to invisible powers. The production of such abundance at the potlatch was 'proof' of access to ancestral powers (Boas 1925 : 269****). In this way the performance of potlatch can be seen as a moment when visible and invisible worlds were brought together in the person of the title taker. This is quite a claim, and only a spectacular performance of distribution would convince this audience. In this context it was not enough simply to distribute blankets, or pour oil on the fire. Potlatch events were carefully staged sonic and visual performances, and without these elements the potlatch was deemed a failure (Graeber 2001: 203) . It was also perhaps because of the claims involved that the theatre of the potlatch events seems constantly to hover between the transcendent and the ridiculous -another way of referring to certain potlatch rituals in Kwakwala was 'frauds' (Graeber 2001: 200) .
Like most of the anthropologists of his day, Mauss saw this in evolutionary terms. To study the potlatch was to take a glimpse into our own deep past, the first stirrings of the impulse that would lead eventually to the modern contract (Parry 1986) . While the concepts of prestige and 'wealth in people' of course pre-dated contact with Europeans, it seems likely that the fervid pitch and theatrical intensity of potlatching was driven by the dynamics of the trade interface. Many of the items of wealth distributed or destroyed -blankets, strips of copper, and so on -were European trade goods, obtained in return for furs (Donald 1997: 32) . Several scholars (see Donald 1997: 232, 280; Roth 2002) suggest that for most of its history, the distribution/disposal element of the ritual was about validating or completing access to a quasi-hereditary title. The majority of the population had been commoners or slaves who could not aspire to titles (Donald 1997: 275-95) . But epidemics of European diseases meant a great many ritual offices were unoccupied, and that a much wider pool of nouveau aspirants tried to fill these through potlatch (Ringel 1979 , Wolf 1997 .
. Capitalist demand, in this case for furs, outstripped anything that harvesting natural systems could supply for any length of time, while competition to control the trade, and the imperative to obtain people to replace those who had died of disease, rendered war and slavery more common. In the context of radical instability, frequent and impressive displays of authority became more necessary. As the supply of animal pelts became exhausted in one region, trade routes pushed further inland. Slaves were traded for furs with the peoples of the interior, whose numbers were similarly decimated by disease (Donald 1997: 214--53; Wolf 1997: 191-4 ).
This process is far from unique. Earlier, on the east coast of America, the Iroquois 'state' seems to have undergone a similar transformation. Their 'mourning war complex', resembling a blood feud, where dead clan members were 're-quickened' by kidnappings from neighbouring groups, morphed into a system where over half the Iroquois population were in fact enslaved foreigners (Starna and Watkins 1991), while trade items, obtained from Europeans for furs -wampum, kettles, distilled alcohol (which as in West Africa probably had strong ritual connotations), guns, and clothescirculated more intensely than previously (Richter 1992: 75-104 ).
As we will see, there is a striking similarity between this and what was happening in Central Africa, where both war and wild, expensive rituals seem to proliferate. Like 
Central Africa
Many explanations have been proffered for Central Africa's particular form of insertion into the world Economy. Particularly convincing to me are explanations which stress the disruptive and militarising effects of the slave and commodity trades in the region (see Harms 1981 , Manning 1990 , Inikori and Engerman 1992 , and those which stress the tendency for central African elites to sell the means of production, both human and ecological. In a context of relatively low demographic pressure disgruntled subordinates could simply disappear into the vast tracts of unoccupied land when things got tough, and there was little incentive to intensify production. Thus rulers saw forms of 'outsourced exploitation', notably the transatlantic slave trade, as an attractive alternative (see for example Manning 1992 , Cooper 2000 , Austin 2008 , 2008a . Nevertheless, for reasons we explore in detail in the second half of this essay, such explanations are not by themselves sufficient.
Elsewhere demographic collapse and war have boosted productivity and central authority -the black-death related fall of western European populations at the end of the middle ages set the scene for capitalism (Brenner 1977) , while the increase in war of Europe's 18 th century greatly encouraged centralised authority (Tilly 1985) .
A crucial dimension we must consider in understanding this dynamic in Africa was, I
believe, the interaction of two very different types of society. (Meillasoux 1960; Rey and Dupré 1969; Rey 1971 (Bloch 1985) . Dupré and Rey's (1969) arguments about the 'lineage mode of production' then departed radically from all 'party lines', and also from the speculations of Marx or Engels about pre-capitalist societies. They depicted a society where the dominance of elders (mbuta) -was based in their rights over the labour of others -slaves of both sexes, most women, and male 'cadets' (lekie) -dependents who were held in various states of social immaturity. These elders appeared to have no very strong control of the means of production -land was plentiful and the chief factor of production was the labour of the young. They nevertheless managed to enforce their dominance via their control over 'social reproduction'. This was affected through exchanges in prestige goods. Such exchanges determined the destinies of slaves, women, and cadets, and were pivotal in allocating labour between corporate groups. The prestige goods were obtained from European merchants at the coast in return for various commodities -including slaves, ivory, and rubber -through chains of exchange monopolised by elders.
Thus, via 'articulating' between the 'capitalist mode of production' and their own 'lineage mode', the elders were also able to control the surpluses others produced, extracting tribute or labour from subaltern groups by manipulating an ideology of descent -where subalterns were defined as junior relatives -and holding out the promise of social advancement to a select few. Thus, contrary to Adam Smith, but also to the vision of capitalism 'battering down all Chinese walls' in The Communist
Manifesto, increased trade did not necessarily undermine pre-capitalist economic dynamics. In fact it often reinforced them. This is not a popular mode of analysis today. One line of attack, associated particularly with the historian EP Thompson (1978) Barthes 1959), but his model, which suggested a role for interest groups within a way of life, rather than a series of games played by individuals 'maximising' their power, was distinctive and convincing.
Meillasoux thus went beyond the confines of both traditional Marxism and liberal social science -both of which, for different reasons, were resistant to the concept of class struggle in non-capitalist places (see also Bloch 1985) . In this sense criticism of 'functionalism' in Meillasoux is anachronistic, in that he is often attacked for 7 Some objections to functionalism are simply an objection to functional explanation -explanations where the intended effect is used to explain the act that causes it. Such arguments are well summed up in the debate between Cohen and Elster (see Cohen 1978 Cohen , 1982 . As Cohen shows, the consequences of denying something like functional explanation a major role in social explanation are fairly extraordinary, and the notion of 'feedback mechanisms', advocated by Elster and subsequently by others is far more problematic than they realise.
intellectual errors that he was instrumental in pointing out, even if he did not completely make the break with earlier modes of analysis (see Donham 1999: 78 Rey the lineage was an ideological form that allowed a certain class of peopleconceived in local terms as 'elders' -to control and exchange rights in other peopleslaves, women, and cadets.
Another common criticism of French Marxist Anthropology was that it pushed a kind of naïve, object-based materialism. Graeber (2006) says:
The ultimate weakness of Mode of Production approaches, it seems to me, is that they begin from a very naive sort of materialism. 'Material production' is assumed to be the production of valuable material objects like food, clothing or gold bullion;
all the important business of life is assumed to be moving such objects around and transferring them from one person or class to another. (2006:9) Graeber uses this characterisation as a foil to his own, very stimulating discussion 9 , and as such it can be forgiven as a useful heuristic, but in terms of intellectual history this is quite wrong. In Meillasoux's and Dupré and Rey's original discussions the success of powerful lineages lay in winning and retaining social subordinates. This relied on exchange -in such exchanges 'things' could important, but the thing that was being exchanged above all was people.
Social Reproduction and social change Dupré and Rey (1969) social reproduction has always been problematic -a mechanism for recreating not society but class power, and a site of struggle across the longue durée.
Regional Specialists
A further problem with critique of FMA has been the fact that the focus of the original debates was West and Central Africa. 11 The harshest criticism has generally been restricted to quite broad philosophical arguments. Discussions by regional specialists, who were able to engage with the details -for example Jane Guyer (1993) or Wyatt MacGaffey (1986, 2000) -were far less polemical, and yet at the same time these scholars far more effectively identified areas of the FMA argument that were problematic.
Thus Wyatt MacGaffey's work on ritual and power can be seen as a useful corrective to the over-strong focus on marriage exchanges by FMA, a focus that probably reflected the influence of Levi-Strauss, who, famously, saw the exchange of women between groups of men as the foundational act of society. But it almost certainly also reflected 'the facts on the ground' as they had been re-cast by colonialism. In the colonial period marriage was the primary site of African lineage elders' power, with male African power structures being reduced and reconfigured within the domestic and rural settings assigned to them by the coloniser. MacGaffey's studies point to a much wider jural/ritual nexus within which exchanges took place.
There is description of a wider set of exchanges in FMA, especially in their longer treatments (e.g. Rey 1971 ), but I think it is fair to say that FMA placed too little emphasis on this wider conception. For it was this complex ideology, rather than the narrower set of exchanges foregrounded by the FMAs, that was essential to making up the class power of the elders. Jane Guyer's seminal (1993) essay on exchange in what she calls Equatorial Africa, includes a respectful discussion of FMA's contribution, but she identifies some even more crucial issues. The first is that the region has been the site of intense political turmoil, with radical instability in the value of people and things. Given this radical instability, the efficacy of 'things' -currencies and other valuables -as a mechanism of social control appears as 'a problem to be explained, rather than a premise to be claimed' (Guyer 1996: 245) . Guyer then goes some way to solving the problem she has identified. Exchanges were not mechanical rituals with precisely quantified amounts of social currency. They were unstable performances where the outcome was not certain. In such performances the fates of the 'little people' were sealed, but at the same time the persons of elites, and aspirant elites, were adorned, ranked against one another, glorified and assigned value. In a system where people were the ultimate form of wealth, 'wealth in things' was an essential adjunct to creative theatrical performances designed to establish the wealth and status of individuals in unstable circumstances. This insight -that power was much more theatrical, and more aesthetic, but also wilder and more unstable, is at the heart of my discussion here.
Nevertheless, it is also the case that Guyer (and others such as Barber 2007, who flesh out this picture of creative performance as the route to social status) does not pay enough attention to the fact that such valuations, unpredictable as they could be at the level of individuals, never floated clear of the capacity of a categorically distinct class of elders to extract surpluses from subordinates. Furthermore, rather as Foucault's observes in his discussions of mediaeval forms of power in Europe (Foucault 1998) while the bodies of the elite were singularised, and rendered glorious, so the persons of social juniors were construed as nameless, worthless, invisible and disposable.
Articulating
Criticism of Rey and Dupre's notion of 'articulating modes of production', where capitalist merchants intersect with lineage elders, is in some ways understandable. It is a model of how society works and, like all models, there is a strong temptation to reify the model and forget the complex reality it represents (see Jewsiewicki 1985) . But once again, attacks generally present the crudest, least convincing version of the theory, rather than dealing with the arguments made at their strongest. In the earlier formulations, which deal exclusively with Central Africa, above all Dupré and Rey (1969; see also Rey 1971 and Dupré 1982) , these put forward quite a subtle idea of articulation, as a product of multiple weakness -the merchants' inability to penetrate the interior, and the elders' inability to exploit the cadets beyond a fairly narrow set of limits. This offered a way of thinking about the effect of capitalism on non-Western peoples, without ignoring the internal dynamics of non-capitalist societies and without depicting the capitalist mode of production as all-powerful. It is notable that in the case of capitalism, Marx defines the mode of production by the primary form of accumulation -capital -and here I follow the same principle. As I argued in the introduction, in the mode of production under discussion here the primary site of accumulation is 'wealth in people'. David Graeber (2011), following
Polanyi calls these societies 'human economies', 13 a designation that recognises the fundamental object of exchange and accumulation in these places -people. To incorporate this insight within my wider theoretical vocabulary I am calling these 12 While rhetorical attacks on 'empiricism' (bourgeois or otherwise) can be tiresome, here they may be in order. 13 Graeber's nomenclature follows Polanyi but I think he is more aware of what is actually distinct about these economies. Guyer's (1993) , who is clearly also influenced by Polanyian Anthropology, adopts the term 'wealth in people' which is also related.
social arrangements 'human modes of production', a broad category of which Dupré and Rey's 'lineage mode of production' is clearly a variant. The term 'human mode of production' also recognises the debt of this theoretical approach towards substantivist anthropology.
And yet while I am influenced by Graeber's 'human economy' I believe that his theorisation draws too uncritically on classic anthropological texts -notably Mary Douglas on the Lele (1968). Graeber presents the Lele as a kind of baseline, against which the slave-trade induced depravity of other human economies can be measured.
In this pre-Lapserian state, human economies kept a strict divide between people and things. Slavery -where people and currencies could be equivalent -existed as a dangerous precedent, but for the Lele it was marginal and categorically distinct from insistence by Douglas's Lele informants that pawnship -which was still openly practiced -was categorically distinct from slavery 15 -which was heavily suppressedcannot be taken at face value. Fear of the colonial authorities, not Arcadian isolation, may explain why the Lele appear so different.
Trade and articulation.
Most European merchants were seeking to acquire various raw materials from the interior of other continents -such as furs, slaves, ivory, spices, or precious metals.
But what did their non-European trading partners want? Sometimes they traded their wares for things like shells or bits of metal that had worked as currency before the new traders arrived. In these cases European merchants were sometimes able to use their wider reach to source these items more cheaply, as in the importation of shell valuables into West Africa. At other times the Europeans, or their diseases, had wiped out the coastal peoples who had supplied the valuables before -as in the case of wampum (sacred shell beads) in America. 16 Other goods carried by Europeans in trading with human modes of production seem more diverse, though certain themes do recur -firearms, distilled alcohol, textiles, forms of glass and ceramics. Invariably these European goods displaced or demoted items of local manufacture as objects of prestige and in systems of social currency. A detailed enquiry into why this should have been the case is beyond the range of this study, but clearly metaphysical aspects were in play, and imported goods were often associated with legitimating supernatural powers (Bernault 2006; MacGaffey 2000) . At the same time the imports were generally manufactured goods from places capable of a quality and scale of production that the local economy could not match.
The introduction of these goods did not alter the fundamental dynamic of these 15 A clandestine indigenous trade in slaves, especially in female slaves continued well into the 20th century in many parts of the Congo, and this was certainly true for the Bakuba, the immediate neighbours of the Lele. The comment in Vansina's (2010) book that a Lele healer 'accompanied by his slave ' (2010:241) ministered to the Kuba king Kwet Mabinc (1919 Mabinc ( -1939 , implies that this was also the case for the Lele. In matrilineal societies, like the Lele, one of the main attractions of female slaves was that their children's labour would belong to their father, rather than, as was the case for free wives, to the maternal uncle. Vansina also states that the children of pawn wives among the Bushong (the central ethnicity in the Kuba polity who were also matrilineal) -owed part of their labour to the husband implying that they were somewhat comparable to slave wives (Vansina 2010:241) . 16 In fact, while some form of shell valuable had existed before, 'true wampum is a cross-cultural product of European-Indian contact for it could be made only with iron tools' (Richter 1992: 85). systems; rather, it added momentum to the existing, internal set of trade relations, which were invariably linked to acquiring rights over people via control of social reproduction. This increased momentum of trade concurrently undermined local systems of production, through increases in disease and slavery, and also by intensifying political and military ferment. Why this happened is not self-evident.
Adam Smith's belief that 'the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another' (Smith 1776 (Smith /2000 leads to a greater and more productive division of labour is still an axiom of modern economics, while recent historical sociology (for example, Tilly 1985; Ferguson 2002) has suggested that in Europe the wars of the eighteenth century were in fact laboratories of the state, where central devices of modern administrative power were developed.
Clearly the prior development of productive powers is key to these divergent outcomes. Tributary states and human modes of production were pushed in opposite directions by their interaction. Slave labour from Africa allowed Britain to run regimes of 'extended primitive accumulation' in the Americas, sustaining a transition to capitalism that might otherwise have foundered during the frequent reversals of the early industrial revolution (Blackburn 1997: 509-73) . The polarising effect was also political-economic. In Western Europe new forms of more costly and technologically demanding war entailed new forms of raising money that would not undermine the economic production needed to pay for these vast mobilisations. In a variety of ways -tax farming, government bonds, the grand bargain between accountable legislatures and taxable populations -they found powerful new mechanisms that allowed them to pay for military campaigns and, as a by-product, dramatically increased the revenueraising capacity of central authority (see Tilly 1985) .
Human modes of production were capable of considerable brutality but, even at their worst, the wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Africa and the Americas were far less violent than European conflicts of the time -battles in Central Africa, as in North America, seem to have resembled a form of ritualised kidnapping and were generally abandoned after a handful of casualties (MacGaffey 2000; Richter 1992 ). It was not, then, the savagery of war where Human modes of production were disadvantaged -European wars of the period were probably more violent and more destructive of productive infrastructure than conflicts elsewhere.
Rather it is in the way that political entities financed conflict and authority more generally where differences can be observed that seem to disadvantage human modes of production. In Africa and the Americas the resources underwriting authority were sought via an orientation to the outside world ('extraversion' in African studies jargon) and were paid for in ways that undermined the productive powers; such resources included the guns that became increasingly important in war, and also took the form of legitimating ritual, which involved display and dispersal of imported prestige goods. Such problems of authority pre-dated but were also exacerbated by the interaction with Europe.
'They gave us six fishhooks
And two blankets embroidered with smallpox'
(from Paul Muldoon, Meeting the British, 1987) People and the bounty of the natural environment were clearly the pre-eminent factors of production in these low-tech, agrarian societies. Populations which were (probably) sparser than in non-Russia Europe to begin with (see Austin 2007) andwere already severely affected 17 by disease and low fertility caused by European encroachment -were also sold on to raise capital, while the other trade goods which 17 Population figures for America and Africa pre-1500 are very speculative. 'Respectable' estimates for the population of the pre-Columbian Americas range between 14,000,000 and 117,000,000 (see M.White 2011 for overview). Even were it the case that there were areas of very dense populations in the Americas, it is certain that disease had a huge impact on these areas. The pre-contact Pacific northwest (which was an incredibly bounteous area) clearly had unusually high populations for a nonagricultural society, but it is also clear that these populations suffered catastrophic declines (Boyd 1999) . Africa was probably more densely populated than the Americas, but the evidence tends to show that it was considerably less populated than Europe -Thornton's (1977) estimate of population densities in the Kingdom of Kongo arrived at a figure of 4.1 people per square kilometre by the beginning of the 18 th century, While Manning (in Austin 2008a) estimates densities in 1750 of 2.3-3 per kilometre for tropical Africa, this is to be contrasted with non-Russian European population densities in 1750 of around 23-27 per kilometre (Thornton 1977; Austin 2008) . African populations south of the Sahara were flat during the 18 th and 19 th centuries according to respectable guesstimatese.g. Durand (1967), Manning (1990:70-71 ). Manning's more detailed and regionally informed guesses suggest that populations fell in West Central Africa during the period 1750-1850. This needs to be set alongside the widespread adoption of neo-tropical food crops in Africa, which would have increased food security (Austin 2008) and in other parts of the world contributed to large population increases during this period. A further problem with this 'data' is that it is hard to see how these slave trade focussed estimates square with the sleeping sickness and 'red rubber' mortality and population estimates, which cover Central Africa from the 1860's until around 1910. Both Manning and Durand indicate a modest recovery or stabilisation of the population just as other scholars say it was entering a period of catastrophic decline.
capitalism demanded of human modes of production were reliant on the harvesting of natural systems until their collapse.
In the case of wild rubber harvesting, which occurred in the interregnum between the invention of vulcanised rubber in the late 1840s and the maturation of rubber tree plantations in Malaya in the twentieth century, we see another example of the 'extended primitive accumulation' model Blackburn uses to understand plantation slavery. Rubber extraction in Central Africa, and the extreme forms of attendant violence it caused, reached their apogee under the Belgians, but were well under way before their arrival. Beginning in the gallery forests of northern Angola, the trade pushed up into the Congo Basin, drawing on the same classes of Kongo, Ovimbundu, Bobangi and Swahili intermediaries who were involved in trades for slaves and ivory.
The disruption, increased interconnectivity, and violence of these trades led to huge increases in disease -notably sleeping sickness, venereal disease and measles -and disease and stress related sterility, as well as falls in food production. This caused very significant falls in the population in parts of Central Africa, persisting well into the twentieth century (Harms 1981; Vos 2003; Vellut 2004; Horchschild 1998; Roes 2010; AM.White 2011) 18 . The difficulty of supplying the exponential growth in capitalist demand from a forest product meant that the trade involved ever more violent pressure on non-capitalist peoples to fill in the gaps, while a fully capitalist system based on plantation arboriculture established itself. 19 This was not a system that allowed for any sustained accumulation of power or wealth within Central Africa.
In this way human modes of production appear to have become locked into a dynamic, reinforced by the European merchants, where individual prosperityconceived of as rights in people and dispersals of wealth over retinue -became dependent on aggregate impoverishment -via selling, or pushing beyond breaking point, the means of production. As we can see this account does not espouse the view,
proposed by the cruder forms of dependency theory, that Africans were cheated of their birth-right in exchange for valueless trinkets. At some points in the last 400
18 How significant is the subject of huge controversy. Aldwin Roes (2010) is a fine overview of a vexed issue.
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This was especially true in the case of African rubber, which was not tapped as it was in the Amazonian case, but harvested from creepers and involved killing the plant.
years, above all during the eighteenth century, Africans were able to obtain high prices for their commodities (Eltis and Jennings 1998) , and indeed such high prices are a part of our story. Prices paid for African commodities took the form of huge importations of European manufactured goods. The vast importations of goods into Africa 20 produced a singular set of effects that are still felt in the forms of political subjectivity found in Africa.
A series of trades emerge in the pre-colonial period -slavery, ivory, rubber -that supply the escalating demands of capitalism, but also drive forms of ritual escalation within human modes of production. As the capacity of peoples near the coast to For example, for much of the eighteenth century Africa, along with the West Indies, was the main market for British textile exports (Blackburn 1997: 522) .
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Blessings were often conceived of as a transfer of ancestral substances, stored within the person, and, just as the vomit of nobles was sacred in the potlatch cultures of the Americas (Walens 1981) , here both the breath and spittle of elders take on a sacred quality.
continuous income' and 'organised a flow of wealth upward from poor to rich ' (ibid.: 36) . It is worth underlining once more the similarity between this form of social organisation and that found among the true 'potlatch' societies of the north-western coast of America, as this description of enslavement in the latter makes clear:
The miscellany of causes for enslavement within one's local group suggests that the very poor might easily find themselves in a position where they could not meet some imposed financial obligation and, lacking the protection of powerful kin (probably the definition of very poor in this culture area) were then subject to enslavement. Donald (1997: 120) Elders on the lower Congo could also draw on their stock of trade goods to buy further titles, which offered further gatekeeping opportunities. Participation in rituals and institutions which granted prestige, office, and legitimacy all required a supply of trade goods -whether in acceding to public office as a 'chief', or undergoing initiation into mystical societies that doubled as cross-ethnic trading associations (see Janzen 1982).
As in the societies of North-Western America, funerals were probably the dominant ritual with notions of succession and the assertion of the temporal and supernatural powers of the deceased's lineage being important in both places. As accounts make clear, the funerals of notables required vast expenditure -grave goods including toby jugs and china dogs from Stoke on Trent, vast quantities of food and palm wine served to guests and poured out in libations, explosions of gunpowder, and slaves who would be strangled or simply thrown live into the grave 22 (Laman vol ii 1953-68:85-90; Dupré 1985:184-201) . Most strikingly, the corpse itself would be wound in imported red cloth -cloth which was used as a form of money -until the bundle was enhanced to massive proportions. The relatives of the deceased would dance with this great burden to the grave. And it is clear that dancing was not an incidental feature of such events. Music and dance recur again and again in the nexus of jural, funerary, and therapeutic exchanges.
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Fetishism: ideologies of generation and the dead
This obsession with the dead brings us to a final aspect of Marxist theory. For
Marx the capitalist mode of production depended not simply on material circumstances but also on a specific form of ideology that fetishised capital and commodities divorced from the wider relations of production, such that it appears as 'money that begets money' (Marx 1867 (Marx /1961 . Marx himself asserted that, in precapitalist modes of production people were not mystified about the sources of value, and that social relations were simply sustained by violence. I believe this is unlikely, and that historical and ethnographic evidence from central Africa points in a different direction. Just as the capitalist mode of production fetishises capital 24 , so the human mode of production fetishizes certain powerful persons.
Graeber's description of Lele exchange takes to the heart of the matter. Noting the hierarchical nature of gift exchange -where gifts of raffia cloth flowed upward from the cadets to the elders -Graeber notes 'it never occurred to those receiving [raffia cloth] that they should have to reciprocate in any way' (p138). This accurately encapsulates Douglas's ethnographic account, and is, broadly speaking, also true for the FMA accounts 25 .
But the ethnography of the region, viewed more broadly, shows that in the local conception, cadets are explicitly seen as indebted to the elders. Much of this was related to the skilful manipulation of prior surpluses by the elders of course, but this cannot be separated from a second, purely ideological factor. Everywhere one looks in 23 This nexus of material and musical/kinetic ideas of power is noted by Guyer, speaking of the Igbo, along the coast of Atlantic Africa (2004: 78) : 'Proximity of ones most valued self to the ancestors was courted in dance and ritual. In dance one could cross over the thin line between this world and the spiritual world...
[while] title objects were stored in the rafters close to the ancestral shrine, along with all the important items that extol the force of individual status....' 24 The term commodity fetishism is widely used, by Marx and others, but Marx makes it clear that it is in capital itself -represented by its adherents as 'money which begets money' or 'portion fructifiante de la richesse ' (1970: 15; 1990: 523) -that fetishism is most entrenched, and most central to capitalism's self-understanding (see also the discussion in Volume 3, Marx 1895 Marx /1991 . 25 In the mongraphs of both Rey (1971) and Dupré (1985) there are certainly discussion of metaphysical beliefs about the power of the elders in relation to the dead but it is not made as central as it could be. central Africa elders (and the powerful more generally) are seen as receptacles of ancestral substances from the land of the dead (see particularly MacGaffey 2000 , Warnier 2007 . Substances connected to the bodies of elders via a series of metaphorical connections -spittle, white clay or chalk, breath, palm wine imbibed and then spat out -are conceptualised as a kind of blessing. These blessings from elders to the cadets are believed to be necessary to any kind of social flourishing, but are also everywhere a formal part of the work of allowing or retarding social reproduction, and ultimately in sorting the slave from the freeborn. The child whose head is not spat on by the elders (a traditional form of blessing) is designated a slave, one who accedes to ritual title has chalk or white clay applied to their eyes by the elders (allowing them to see the world of the dead), etc.
These ideas of invisible exchanges were everywhere in the region enmeshed with the elders' real dominance over certain prestige goods/social currencies, and indeed the distribution of goods by elders was invariably presented as the emanations of their more general munificence. Far from making a distinction between people and things for the purposes of exchange, as Graeber (2012:133) contends, the persistent ideological schema one finds throughout central Africa makes a series of divides that defy this kind of categorisation. Powerful chiefs -but also assorted magical objectswere vessels 'animated' by powerful substances from the dead. The flow of material goods, success in the hunt, or the harvest could all be taken as outward sign of this metaphysical abundance. Social inferiors by contrast were perceived as empty vessels: 'mutu pamba' (vain/empty men), as they were known on the 19 th century lower Congo, and as they are still called in Kinshasa.
Just as under capitalism money and commodities are cast as producing wealth in and of themselves 'as a pear tree produces pears' (Marx 1991: 516) , so in the human mode of production the bodies of powerful people were fetishised as generativedivorced from wider relations of production, powerful people were seen as creating the wealth and fertility they had appropriated.
Given that Marx's use of the term fetishism is an ironic subversion of earlier, derogatory theorisations about the fetish as a mental crutch for the primitive mind (see Pietz 1985) it is worth pointing out that central Africans were never trapped in a state superstitious dread by this ideology -the legitimacy of exchange was often challenged -revolts by obstreperous youths, slave lineages, or new cults are a constant theme in the history of the region. But within a political economy ever more based around pillage, this chronic lack stability also led to ever more desperate and extravagant potlatch performances by those who aspired to authority (reliant on ever more unsustainable forms of exploitation).
Conclusion
Human modes of production were not eradicated but expanded and transformed by their interaction with capitalism. This was due to a dynamic where ecological, demographic and ritual imperatives fed off each other. As I have argued FMA scholarship did much to explain this situation, integrating ideas of history, class, and contested social reproduction with earlier functionalist and substantivist accounts of exchange. As we have also shown, the FMA formulation, like earlier anthropological accounts, tended to overstress marriage exchanges at the expense of a much wider jural and therapeutic ritual nexus. They also downplayed the role of theatre, aesthetics, and metaphysical beliefs in sustaining the power of elders and chiefs in a situation that was radically unstable. In a similar way ecological and demographic concerns need to be integrated into this schema -not at the expense of socio-cultural explanation but as part of a complex whole.
The striking similarity in the way that human modes of production reacted to their capitalist mode of production -not by the weakening of extant social logics but by a kind of social and ritual escalation we have called the potlatch -suggests that these phenomena are an aspect of global modernity.
